China has maintained neighborly relations through diplomacy despite disputed territories

I was delighted to share with you my observations on issues relating to China's foreign policy. I do not want to spend too much time on the title of Professor Jonathan Holslag's new book: China's Coming War with Asia, since there's nothing new in this point of view. Ever since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, scholars from the United States and Europe have continued to come up with such predictions. Yet more than half a century has passed and nothing real has come out of such predictions.

I would rather focus on the key point of the book. In this book, Holslag outlines the history of China's diplomacy since 1949, and analyzes China's territorial disputes with its neighbors, especially issues relating to the East China Sea, South China Sea and the China-India border dispute. At the end of his analysis, Holslag concludes that China's most important interests are incompatible with the idea of a peaceful development in a complex Asia environment, and that the tragedy of great power politics are unavoidable.

Since the core point of the book is about whether China's core interests are compatible with its idea of peaceful development, we should first and foremost make clear what China's core interests are. In the 2011 white paper on China's peaceful development, China has a clear definition of its core interests, namely state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, a sound political system, overall social stability, and basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development. For any country in the world, these elements would be essential for survival and development. No country in the world would accept infringements from foreign countries on their sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, national unity, the constitutional system and social stability. Therefore, there is no logic in pitting the core interests and peaceful development against each other. Otherwise, no country in the world would be able to achieve peaceful development.

Another argument Holslag uses to support his conclusion on China's coming war with Asia is that the Communist Party of China has been seeking the recovery of lost territory, which is where the danger of war comes from.

Since Holslag studies the diplomatic history of China, he should know that in 1949, when the CPC replaced Kuomintang as the ruling party, China had territorial disputes with all its neighbors on land. The PRC government has managed to peacefully settle disputes through diplomatic negotiations with 12 out of 14 neighboring countries. If you compare the square kilometers of land in question with the results of the final settlement, you will see that China has adopted a pragmatic approach when it comes to territorial disputes. The British empire took away 90,000 square kilometers of land from China through unfair treaties and incorporated them into British Burma. In the end, China recovered less than 500 square kilometers in 1960. Tsarist Russia took away 1.5 million square km of land from China through unfair treaties, and China recovered no more than 1,500 square km in the 1990s from Russia and three post-Soviet neighboring countries. Therefore, there is no proof in history to say that China cannot resolve territorial disputes and has to resort to war.

Holslag analyzed four issues: the Diaoyu Islands issue with Japan, the South China Sea issue with the Philippines and Vietnam, the border issue with India, and the Taiwan question.

I would also like to emphasize that the Taiwan question is completely different in nature from the other three. Taiwan was once taken away by Japan in 1895, but was returned to China in 1945 de jure and de facto. Although the Chinese civil war caused separation in 1949, both sides across the Taiwan Straits believe that it belongs to China. The major disagreement is about who is the legal representative of China. Therefore, this is a question between the Chinese across the Straits in terms of how and when the reunification will be realized, rather than an issue of recovering lost territory, let alone an issue of disputed territory with any foreign country.

On the Diaoyu Islands issue, China's position is to resolve the issue through negotiations. If the conditions are not right, then the issue can be set aside. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping met with Japanese prime minister Takeo Fukuda, and said: "When China and Japan normalized their relations, both countries agreed that this issue should not be involved. Now we negotiate the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship, we also agreed not to deal with this issue. We believe that we should set the issue aside for a while if we cannot reach agreement on it. It is not an urgent issue and can wait for a while. If our generation does not have enough wisdom to resolve this issue, the next generation will have more wisdom, and I am sure that they can find a way acceptable to both sides to settle this issue". The Diaoyu Islands issue was shelved from 1972 until 2012, when the Japanese right-wing politician Shintaro Ishihara, and later the Japanese government, announced the "purchase" of the Diaoyu Islands in a bid to "nationalize" them. That changed the status quo of the islands and triggered tension in the East China Sea. In spite of this situation, the two sides reached a four-point, principled consensus in 2014 so as to avoid any unexpected event from happening. Although the problem is not resolved, the situation has eased.

On the South China Sea issue, the Chinese government's position remains to be upholding sovereignty, seeking a diplomatic solution, shelving differences and seeking joint development. Since China has already solved 90 percent of land disputes with neighboring countries through peaceful negotiations, why is it not possible to resolve maritime disputes in the same way? In fact, China has settled the Beibu (Tonkin) Gulf demarcation issue with Vietnam in 2000 through negotiations. China reached agreement with Vietnam and the Philippines over geological exploration on the South China Sea. China also reached an agreement with Brunei on joint exploration of the overlapping exclusive economic zone.

With regards to the China-India border issue, after a short military clash in 1962, the two governments decided to safeguard peace and tranquility along the line of actual control. In 1993, the two sides signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border, that means the status quo will be respected by both parties before the issue is finalized. In 1996, the two sides signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, which means the two sides agreed not to use force. In 2005, the two sides signed the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question, which reaffirmed the principle of "meaningful adjustments on the basis of actual control" to resolve the border issue. The two sides have always managed to solve problems between border patrols in disputed areas through diplomatic talks. So, again, disputes do not necessarily lead to war.

At this point, the conclusion is clear. Regardless of the historical facts or China's position over disputed territory, it is too arbitrary to argue that China's core interests will inevitably cause war with neighboring countries. In fact, if we look at the overall picture, we will see that the situation in Asia is much more peaceful and stable than many other regions in the world, and the economic cooperation between China and Asian countries are much more effective.

The author is China's ambassador to Belgium. The article is his remarks on the book launch debate of China's Coming War with Asia.

(China Daily European Weekly 03/20/2015 page11)